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To change our thinking: Philosophical practice for difficult times

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If a time of crisis calls for a new mode of thinking, philosophical practice offers the means to answer that call. Contemporary philosophical practice revitalises the ancient Greek understanding of philosophy as a way of life that cultivates personal transformation and new ways of seeing the world. This article describes the development of the author's philosophical counselling practice as a practice of emancipation, in concert with the writings of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Rancière. It considers the significance of personal engagement and companionship for the cultivation of practical wisdom, and suggests that the intransigence of our global social and economic crises ultimately indicates an incorrect view of human nature and an ossified or unbalanced relationship between practical and theoretical ways of knowing and wisdom.

The self-confidence of the human being, freedom, has first of all to be aroused again in the hearts of these people. Karl Marx (1843a)

Duty

David Harvey, distinguished professor of anthropology and geography, concluded a 2010 talk on the crises of capitalism with these words: “We have a duty, it seems to me, those of us who are academics and seriously involved in the world, to actually change our mode of thinking” (The RSA 2010).

It is not just economics. Our social, political, spiritual and environmental milieux are riddled with crises, and all the information and technology in the world fails to bring us to balance and sanity. Any real solution will have to come about through a different mode of thinking. To say that “we have a duty” suggests that such a change is both imperative and possible.

Why is this a duty for “academics”? Academics are society's designated thinkers. If the crisis calls for a different mode of thinking, then who should or could answer but academics? Except if the crisis calls for a different mode of thinking, then the current mode of thinking is itself implicated, and current thinkers as well. It is not clear whether academics are obliged to step up and address the crisis or to take a time-out and think about what they have done. Or both. Or neither.

It seems to me that Harvey opens another possibility with his “it seems to me”. It seems (feels, appears) like this to *me*, to “I, David”. Only a person can be seriously involved. Only a person can feel called to duty and answer the call. The Marxist professor studies the crises of capitalism to understand and explain it, but “I, David” finds himself responsible in the world. The conscience animates and informs the professional role, brings the professor to life. The research he does provides the means and resources to give effect to the personal commitment. In the fitness of this, we sense integrity and authenticity in the man and the work.

Closing the lecture, he speaks candidly to fellow thinkers of a duty to change “our mode of thinking”. The crisis in the world calls for a transformation in us, in how we relate to the world. Harvey's “we” is an invocation, that it may produce and bring forth others. As I respond, I identify myself. Here I am, involved and duty bound. I single myself out to take part in this “we”. (For my part, I would note that we are not only academics.)

Skeptikos

What is to be done “to actually change our mode of thinking”? The immediate conundrum is, of course, how to think about effecting such a change by means of the mode of thinking that we are called upon to transform. If our way of thinking is part of the problem we are trying to resolve, then any plan that strikes us as logical or reasonable will only dig us deeper into the hole. We do not yet know what we are trying to do. If we think we do, we are likely wrong.

At the same time, we are not giving up on reason and knowledge. With the criteria for judgement—and even what would count as evidence—themselves in question, we become sceptics by default. I do not mean those dogmatic doubters who somehow know that nothing can be known, but seekers (*skeptikos*) in the classic manner of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus: “him who investigates or researches as opposed to him who asserts and thinks that he has found” (Unamuno 1925, 154). We would very much like to know, but then—in an immediate, situated experience of undecidability (*aporia*)—we find that we cannot. Our judgement suspends itself (*epokhē*). In this suspense, we search: expectant, uncertain and vigilant.

The best we can do is to start out from where find ourselves, taking up with whatever is both ready-to-hand and resonant with this sense of duty whose call we answer. In this preliminary exploration, what can guide us? Some outside influence, necessarily, but one that is not coercive, not undue.

There are two guiding clues already on the scene. One is the weirdness of the sense of duty we feel, of finding ourselves obliged beyond any contract we signed on for. This is unreasonable to our current thinking, but neither can we completely dismiss it or rationalise it away. Nor do we want to. We may be mistaken about *what* we should do, but that we are called to respond feels necessary and true. Not true like a fact but self-evident as gravity, or true as the flight of an arrow. It keeps us grounded and on course.

The second clue is this first-person plural “we”. I and I and I. Singular persons whose commonality is just this sense of responsibility, who have given their word and will stand by it, this community that exists otherwise than our usual categorical or blood premises of identity. To change how I think, I need access to other minds. The others also depend on me. In our shared difference, we talk together, wrangle with each other, think things through. Keeping company, we keep each other honest.

ABCs

Every social or political project is built on some idea of human nature, of what we are and what we are here for: viz. *given* that people are ABC, it is *reasonable* that, it *makes sense* that, and we *should do* XYZ. Put differently, everything we call a “fact” already expresses some theory and every theory has its own practical and moral order, from which inevitably proceed certain courses of action and their consequences.

When socio-political projects yield increasingly unreasonable, destructive or depraved “unintended” consequences, it is precisely their hidden intention—the foundational premise of the human, the generative ABC—that must be revealed and questioned. For example, the Protestant/Western/capitalist projects of liberalism and neoliberalism express an idea of human being that, for all its dedication to reason and freedom, has also sustained and justified monstrous histories of domination and devastation. Where it is given that human beings are both sinful and elect in the eyes of God, and where it is given that we are self-centred and self-interested profit-seeking antagonists in a war of all against all, there it appears that such evil is inevitable (to the endless regret of all right-thinking men). Attempts to mitigate or resist wicked consequences are never good enough. They often make things worse.

I do not know what David Harvey was thinking in 2010, but it seems to me that this is what a “duty to actually change our mode of thinking” signifies. Our global crisis leads all the way down to the root question of philosophy: what it means to be a person, a subject, a self. What it means to be true. And that, if we could understand humanness differently and be directed by that understanding, there might be a solution.

Clay Shirky (2009), in an article on “thinking the unthinkable”, tells us that

there is one possible answer to the question “If the old model is broken, what will work in its place?” The answer is: Nothing will work, but everything might. Now is the time for experiments, lots and lots of experiments.

We each take up the task in our own way, by means of our own concerns, experience and possibilities, in the positions we happen to hold and the roles in which we have been cast. Profusion is our friend. What follows draws from the workings of a small experiment in the field of philosophical practice.

Philosophical practice

Philosophical practice is the contemporary revival of philosophy as a means to personal transformation. In his *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, Pierre Hadot (1995, 107) calls this the “original aspect” of Western philosophy: “not as a theoretical construct, but as a *method for training people to live and look at the world in a new way*” (emphasis added).

Acknowledging that readers may be put off by the phrase “spiritual exercise”, Hadot (1995, 81) insists that no other adjective covers “all the aspects of reality we want to describe”. The spiritual exercises of early Latin Christianity, such as Ignatius of Loyola’s *Exercitia spiritualia*, were themselves a development of earlier Greek *askesis* (from *askein* “to exercise”), and so “[i]n the final analysis, it is to antiquity that we must return in order to explain the origin and significance of this idea of spiritual exercises, which...is still alive in contemporary consciousness” (Hadot 1995, 82).

The Greek Skeptic, Stoic and Epicurean schools of philosophy all recognised that unnecessary suffering is caused by dogmatic belief and unwarranted fear and desire. Each school offered specific remedial exercises that included reading and contemplation, investigation, attentiveness, self-mastery, truth seeking, indifference to indifferent things, and a keen awareness of mortality. Dialogue, friendship and community were essential to their practices of learning to live, learning to dialogue, learning to read and learning to die (Hadot 1995, 81–109).

Over the centuries, Western philosophy largely abandoned, or was relieved of, this transformative therapeutic tradition. Hadot (1995, 107) dates it back to the Middle Ages when spiritual exercises were “relegated to Christian ethics and mysticism” and philosophy was called upon to supply conceptual and theoretical support for Christian theology. In the modern age, he continues, when

philosophy regained its autonomy, it still retained...its purely theoretical character, which even evolved in the direction of a more and more thorough systematization. Not until Nietzsche, Bergson, and existentialism does philosophy consciously return to being a concrete attitude, a way of life and of seeing the world (Hadot 1995, 108).

Twentieth-century psychoanalysts and psychotherapists made use of existentialism and phenomenology for therapeutic purposes, but it was not until the 1980s that philosophers began to develop non-dogmatic, non-systematic practices to help individuals to “live and look at the world in a new way”.

Gerd Achenbach opened the first philosophical counselling practice near Cologne, Germany in 1981, and similar initiatives rapidly appeared across Europe, in North and South America, the Middle East and Asia (Gutknecht 2006, 2). The Southern African Philosopher Consultants Association (SAPCA) was formed around 2000. In 2014, the 13th International Conference of Philosophical Practice was held in Belgrade, with more than one hundred participants presenting papers, workshops and master classes (for abstracts, see Serbian Philosophical Practitioners’ Association 2014).

Different forms of philosophical practice have proliferated, with the best known being philosophical counselling and consulting, philosophy cafés, and philosophy for children (or “P4C”). Philosophers develop practices along the lines of their own interests and experience (Lahav and Tillmanns 1995; Marinoff 2000; LeBon 2001; Raabe 2001; Herrestad, Holt and Svare 2002; De Paula and Raabe 2015). Some work in specific areas, perhaps with business or professional

organisations, or with specific populations, such as medical patients, athletes or prisoners, or align themselves with a particular thinker or philosophical school. There is little standardisation across this blossoming frontier, although national characteristics are recognisable (Louw 2009), and there are continuing efforts to establish the profession more formally. Training is available in some countries but a graduate degree in philosophy is generally accepted as the basic requirement.

However, there is a common sensibility that this work is essentially philosophical, and that it brings a neglected source of philosophy back to life. This is sometimes expressed in words ascribed to Epicurus: “Empty is the argument of the philosopher by which no human disease is healed; for just as there is no benefit in medicine if it does not drive out bodily diseases, so there is no benefit in philosophy if it does not drive out the diseases of the soul” (Inwood and Gerson 1997, I–124).

Philosophical counselling for individuals presents itself as an alternative to the standard “medical model” of psychotherapy, with its framework of pathology, diagnosis and treatment:

the philosopher takes his visitor [client/patient] seriously. He isn’t understood by theories, i.e. schematically...but as the unique human being he is. He isn’t judged by any “measure” (of “health”); the question rather is whether he lives according to himself—[in] Nietzsche’s famous phrase: whether he becomes what he is (Achenbach n.d.).

Thomas Gutknecht (2006, 91), linking personal disorientation with social conditions, argues that the “vital necessity” for philosophical practice derives from a “severe disorientation” in contemporary life that shows itself in “the decrease of awareness of oneself as a subject; the loss of intellectual and spiritual energy; the renunciation of autonomy in the face of the sciences; fundamentalism, nihilism and relativism”.

Emancipatory practice

I opened my philosophical counselling practice in Cape Town in 2002, billing it as “engaged conversation” and a “meaningful alternative to psychotherapy”. I had first come to philosophy with questions that arose from my experience in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa; my graduate research considered just war through the phenomenological philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. It was later published as *Love and Arms: Violence and Justification after Levinas* (Douglas 2011).

For Levinas, to be human is to be implicated in an intrigue of ethics and being that is resolved in an infinite responsibility for and before others, a responsibility that is prior to consciousness, and indeed gives rise to it. One finds oneself caught up in being and enjoyment, like Descartes’ *conatus* or Heidegger’s *Dasein*: a being that is concerned with its own being. But this solitary *jouissance* (or malaise) is disrupted by contact with the radical alterity of another person—what Levinas calls “the Face of the Other”. The revelation of one’s responsibility before the Other occurs in a kind of “proto-dialogue”, a prelinguistic expressiveness upon which all other discourse depends. The Face of the Other says, “Thou shall not kill” and at once reveals all humanity, all the other others. The subject responds, “*hineni*”, “*me voici*”, “here I am”. Within my own liveliness and freedom, I am caught up with and for others. With and for others, peace and justice is my business (Douglas 2011). For Levinas, ethics is first philosophy (Levinas 1981; Bergo 2011).

I recognised that this philosophy could ground an ethical non-coercive therapeutic practice. Indeed, many psychologists were taking up Levinas at the same time (e.g. Kunz 1998; Gantt and Williams 2002; Loewenthal and Kunz 2005). I developed my own practice with the support of Andrew Feldmár, a veteran psychotherapist and colleague of the radical Scottish psychiatrist R.D. Laing, as well as an international online community of postmodern therapists hosted by Lois Shawver, a psychologist and Wittgenstein scholar in the US (Shawver 2007).

Five years on, in “Levinas in practice: Face to face and side by side”, I described the double nature of the work as

both face-to-face, in proximity with the other, and side-by-side, engaged together with the other in the work of dialogue. These roles, or phases, are interdependent; each in turn gives rise to and interrupts the other. The counsellor or therapist primarily bears responsibility for

maintaining the relationship face-to-face, while the guest (patient or client) leads the work side-by-side (Douglas 2008, 226).

I reframed this therapeutic work as a “practice of emancipation” (Douglas 2014) after discovering Jacques Rancière’s (1991) *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*. Rancière tells the story of Joseph Jacotot (1770–1840), a French polymath and republican who developed a method for what he called “universal education”. From his own teaching experience, he realised that explanations are not necessary for understanding, and that teachers do not have to know in order to teach. Hence, the “ignorant schoolmaster”. In Jacotot’s (and Rancière’s) view, an education conducted by a learned master guiding an unlearned student along a curricular path teaches nothing but stultification and inequality. All people, Jacotot believed, have an equal capacity for intelligence. Just as every child learns its mother tongue, we learn for ourselves what we want to through exercising our will and discipline. And so:

[o]nce equality of intelligence is posited, the work of education is no longer instruction—one only instructs inferiors—but emancipation, which means “that every common person might conceive of his human dignity, take the measure of his intellectual capacity and decide how to use it” [Rancière 1991, 17]. Accordingly, in classrooms that would emancipate rather than stultify, students apply their will...in order to learn for themselves, and the task of the emancipated master is to reveal to them their innate intellectual power. How? By asking questions or assigning exercises to verify that the students have learned something (Douglas 2014, 1317).

I incorporated this approach into my counselling practice in a “threefold logic” of ground, path and fruition. While the ground and path of the work remain a Levinasian “good practice” of relationship and dialogue, its fruition is now seen as “‘emancipation’, understood broadly as ‘the fact or process of being set free from restrictions’, rather than ‘therapy’, understood narrowly as ‘treatment to relieve a disorder’” (Douglas 2014, 1312).

The recognition of emancipation as the objective of the practice sharpened it in several ways. First, and again, as a critical alternative to psychotherapy:

Someone who seeks counsel is confounded...by both the situation and her inability to extricate herself from it. With a good therapist, an “old master” who treats her with well-founded diagnoses and symptom-alleviating medication, she might well find some relief—but if she isn’t encouraged to find her own way to her own desire and its meaning, she will also pick up a distorted sense of dependency and a reinforced experience of her own inadequacy. Alternatively, if Rancière and Jacotot are right...then we don’t need to be “treated” in order to live well. In an emancipatory counselling practice...we can pay attention to what happens if we stop assuming that some people are mentally or morally unstable—sad, bad, mad or stupid—and look instead for evidence to validate equality (Douglas 2014, 1312).

Second, it expands philosophical practice into the realm of politics. Philosophical practice does not disengage us from the world. On the contrary, it knocks down the false walls between the personal, the psychological and the political aspects of our engagement. Just as we suffer from the arbitrariness of our own minds, we are caught up in the phantasmic beliefs, fears and desires of our society. Even more than Hadot admits, these philosophical “spiritual exercises” take in “all the aspects of reality we want to describe”. This is why some form of consciousness-raising is a necessary supplement to political activism and analysis. As the song says, none but ourselves can free our minds.

Third, an emancipatory philosophical practice restores to philosophy the enigmatic “figure of Socrates” (Hadot 1995, 147–170) as “the ignorant master”, the know-nothing gadfly and perspicacious interlocutor, someone who speaks in plain words about things that matter to real people in their particular lives, helping to clarify the significance of their desires and fears.

In other words, it discloses a dearth of living wisdom in academic philosophy. Do philosophy masters and students today practise self-examination in order to live lives worth living? Does the academy flourish in the pleasures of companionship and collaboration? Are texts read and written as a contemplative practice, “slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers...” (Nietzsche 1992, 5)? In my experience, it is a mixed bag, catch-as-catch-can. But given also the crises in higher education, I do not know of any institution that would be able to take these questions seriously. (“Socrates is dead!” cries the lunatic in the faculty lounge, “And we have killed him again.”)

Self-expression

The people who come to me are self-selected individuals from various demographic origins. Most have previous experience of psychotherapy or psychiatry. They think that something called philosophical counselling might be useful, but they do not much care about theory. They want to make the “real discovery” that will, as Wittgenstein (2010, §133) put it, enable them “to stop doing philosophy when [they] want to”. For them, philosophy begins as a gnawing and unsettling problem. Sometimes the question is clear: a particular choice to be made or transition to be navigated. Sometimes it is an opaque sense of distress, affliction or constraint, as if it were a question of being in question oneself. They are beside themselves. They do not know how to go on.

Someone in this condition comes to me and takes up the intimate intricate work of self-expression through description, reflection and discernment. His business is to find his way; mine is to provide refuge and a fellow traveller’s experience of the road. I listen and respond in a kind of open-ended dialogue (*elenchus*), asking what he means, why he thinks so, presenting other possibilities as they occur to me. Having no interest in dogmatic or diagnostic interrogation (in good Pyrrhonian/Levinasian style), I believe what the person says but I do not ascertain its meaning. We consider his habitual patterns of thought and behaviour, what they signify, what he could do differently and what impedes him. We discover what pains and pleases him, his commitments and weaknesses and dreams. We trace the contours of what is unthinkable or unspeakable. We are trying to make sense. Our progress is guided by usefulness, not in a doctrinaire utilitarian sense, but to move in the direction of more life, more reality, more freedom. He takes the practice into his world, then comes back to tell me about it. Over time, our conversation brings him sufficient clarity and confidence to move on. And so he does. It is always moving to sit with people in their pain, confusion, fear and shame, and to witness at the same time their courage, humour, intelligence and grace. Like Miranda at the end of *The Tempest*, I think, “O wonder! How many goodly creatures are there here!”

This is a fundamentally philosophical scene. A person, a world, a question, an interlocutor. The careful practices of expression and self-awareness. Attention to the suffering caused by unwarranted beliefs, fears and desires. It is not doctrinal. Rather than teaching about virtue, it encourages virtue to develop. Because it takes time, it calls for patience and discipline. Because it is formidable, it calls for gentleness and courage. Because it faces the truth, it is valiant and fierce. We learn how to learn. Practical wisdom (*phronesis*) emerges as a trustworthy sense of orientation, not from principles and rules, but from “the self-confidence of the human being” that Marx (1843a) called freedom. It is not the certainty of achieving the truth so much as the sureness of being true to oneself, true to life, and therefore dependable.

The “real discovery” or the experience of emancipation is rarely once and for all. It requires time and luck and we do not always get there. The will or the imagination may be weak. Sometimes we miss our connection. We can succumb to the pull of other logics, to the imperatives of self-interest, fear and hatred, or the convivial narcosis of the commonplace. Sometimes it is just not time yet. It is not surprising that freedom is hard won, but that it prevails at all suggests it is always possible, always at hand. There is no good reason to suppose that some of us have an inherent capacity for intelligence, goodness and sanity while others do not. But neither can anyone be emancipated against their will. Once we accept the possibility of this basic equality, perhaps all we can do is to create conditions that cultivate the will, the wit and the desire for freedom so that people can make their own way. If so, that would be a reasonable thing to do.

Practical wisdom

To come back to David Harvey's suggestion that another mode of thinking will help us to a solution, picture the source of Western philosophy as a single well from which flowed two streams. The one on the right pursued the course of science with questions about the nature of physical reality and how it all works. The one on the left followed the course of human wisdom with questions of living well in the world with others and what it all means. The philosophers of the right-hand stream studied the water carefully, compared it with other things, formulated and tested theories, devised technologies and complex systems. At the stream on the left, philosophers and their students immersed themselves in the water, learning together to swim, to drink and to drown.

Eventually, all the productive action was happening on the right-hand stream, in terms of objective, abstract and applied reason. The stream on the left dried up or disappeared, leaving behind only some tracts that people still scratch their heads over. On the right, the place of philosophers was gradually usurped by scientists, technologists and engineers. In 2010, the physicist Stephen Hawking declared philosophy "dead": "Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge" (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, 5).

But as early as 1964, the philosopher Martin Heidegger already divined "the end of philosophy" in the rise of "cybernetics", cheerfully recognising this as

the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of a scientific-technological world and of the social order proper to this world. The end of philosophy means the beginning of the world civilization based upon Western European thinking (1977, 377).

Well, as David Harvey says of our current global order, "that's not a world I want to live in, and if you want to live in it, be my guest". This is where Harvey continues:

I don't see us debating and discussing this. I don't have the solutions. I think I know what the nature of the problem is, and unless we're prepared to have a very broad-based discussion that gets away from the normal kind of pabulum you get in the political campaign...It's crap. You should *know* it's crap. And *say* it is. And we have a duty, it seems to me, those of us who are academics and seriously involved in the world, to actually change our mode of thinking (The RSA 2010).

Etymologically, to "discuss" means to "shake apart" and to "dash to pieces". Marx (1843b), in a letter calling for the "ruthless criticism of everything", recommends an equally thorough course: the "reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but by analysing the mystical consciousness that is unintelligible to itself" (*des mystischen, sich selbst unklaren Bewußtseins*), for the "self-clarification...to be gained by the present time of its struggles and desires".

"Mystical consciousness" can be understood as the hidden source of intention and action, whether as the inchoate sense of self from which we experience the world, or as the irreplaceable "I" that presents itself in response to a call from "elsewhere". Anthony Steinbock (2014, 120) calls this the "vocational self": "uniquely who I am with others in the moral universe".

"Reform of consciousness" is synonymous with a "change our mode of thinking". In Marx's (1843b) view, it "consists only in making the world (*daß man die Welt*) aware of its own consciousness, in awakening it out of its dream about itself, in explaining to it the meaning of its own actions". It is a transformational philosophical practice. You do it with people, on the spot.

To change our mode of thinking takes some daring or desperation. To allow everything to come into question—to shake everything apart and subject everything to ruthless criticism—entails a vertiginous leap of faith into epistemic free fall. One faces all the disorientation, terror and awe of awakening. This is why it helps to have good companions, and a guide or midwife (*maieutikos*).

And yet, in proper conditions, we land on our feet. (Figuring out the proper conditions is also always part of the practice.) The self-clarification of our struggles and desires tends towards a way of life that is fundamentally relational, reasonable and workable. To practice with our particular questions in our particular circumstances cultivates a sense of orientation and discernment and a

self-confidence that lets us find our way in the world, in contact and involved. We judge our course by where and what it brings us. When we fall in a hole, we stop digging.

To say this in Greek: *phronēsis*, practical wisdom (or the wisdom of practice), is the necessary ground for the craft-lore of *technē* and the justified knowing of *epistēmē*. We do not just see with our eyes or understand with our brains: we need vision and wisdom. To bring anything to light, we first feel our way in the dark. It is risky. How alert one must be! How open, fearless, receptive and responsive. A person comes to self-awareness as *phronimos*, someone who is sensible, ethical and sane, and as *parrhesiastes*, someone who knows pabulum from politics, someone who can and will tell the truth.

Wisdom and love

It occurs to me that I left something out in my story of the two streams at the beginning of philosophy. It must have been that the first philosophers moved easily between the streams of wisdom and science—or maybe it was one stream with two banks. At any rate, in the beginning, goodness and nature were not separate. *They are still not separate*. When we act as if they are, we are acting under delusion, and this delusion of separation may be the source of all our corruption and craziness. And when we restore the proper relation: that is when we do get things right—not once and for all, but in that situation. It is a practice. We become familiar with it. We acquire a taste for it.

To practise like this re-establishes philosophy as the once and future queen of all sciences. Philosophical practice is not a fashionable contemporary offshoot of the academic discipline of philosophy but a return to its pre-disciplinary root, to the preparatory thinking that is required for thought. It also leads out into the “task of thinking” that remains at “the end of philosophy” (Heidegger 1977)¹ and a suddenly open, unexpected and unpredictable future.

These practices disclose our interrelatedness and interdependence, restore our confidence and integrity, and render us more useful. They guide us to live well with each other in the world, as we should. They disclose to us that knowing and loving are interrelated and interdependent, and that another mode of thinking is already possible.

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¹ See Douglas (2015) for a more extensive engagement with Heidegger’s “The end of philosophy and the task for thinking” and philosophical practice.

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